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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ANITA J. ROBINSON,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 15331

THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH,
Defendant/Respondent.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a decision by the Industrial
Commission of Utah finding that Plaintiff had voluntarily left
her employment without good cause and denying her Unemployment
Compensation for the six weeks from February 20, 1977, to
April 2, 1977, under U.C.A. §35-4-5(a).
DISPOSITION BELOW
The Industrial Commission of Utah through its Board
of Review affirmed a previous decision of a Department of
Employment Security Appeals Referee.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of Defendant's decision.
Further, Plaintiff requests the Court to declare U.C.A.
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§35-4-S(a) invalid, insofar as it chills the exercise
of religious and other freedoms guaranteed by the United
states and Utah Constitutions, by denying a public entitlement due to the exercise of these rights.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff was employed by the University of Utah
as a Secretary/Stenographer from September 21, 1976, to
February 3, 1977, when she left due to unreasonable working
conditions.

She was originally hired with the mutual under-

standing of all parties that she was simultaneously employed
by the Bureau of Reclamation from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. and
that her eight-hour day at the University of Utah would begin
at 11:00 a.m.
On numerous occasions during the course of her
employment, Plaintiff's employer required her to work more
than eight hours, not always even paying compensation, and
on occasion in spite of physical illness.

There were

occasions when the employer required Plaintiff to work on
Sundays in violation of her religious beliefs.

The employer

made no attempt to allow Plaintiff to deal with certain personal
difficulties such as moving or visiting her sick mother.
Plaintiff's personal freedoms apart from that of religion
were spitefully and unreasonably infringed by the employer's
sudden demands for Sunday and other overtime work.

In November,

1976, the employer attempted to prevent Plaintiff from exercising her right to vote.

The employer additionally cri ticizeii,
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chastised, and embarassed Plaintiff with false charges of
improper performance in her trade in the presence of other
employees.
In the light of these numerous difficulties and
unconstitutional restrictions on her freedoms, Plaintiff
was required to terminate her employment on February 3, 1977.
She was informed she would be fired in any case, on February
4, 1977.
ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFF DID NOT LEAVE WORK VOLUNTARILY
WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE, BUT LEFT DUE TO
INFRINGEMENT OF HER FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO
FREEDOM OF RELIGION.

This Court's review is limited to deciding whether
there is "substantial competent evidence to sustain the
findings and decisions of the Appeals Referee and the Board
of Review."

Martinez v. Board of Review, 25 U.2d 131, 477

P.2d 587, 588 (1970).

In the instant case, the evidence

presented renders Defendant's final decision unsustainable
under the law.
U.C.A. §35-4-5(a), under which Defendant made its
decision, provides:
An individual shall be ineligible for benefits
or for purposes of establishing a waiting period:
(a)
For the week in which he has left work
voluntarily without good cause, if so found
by the commission, and for not less than one
or more than the five next following weeks,
as determined by the commission according
to the circumstances in each case, provided
that when such individual has had no bona
fide employment between the week in which he
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voluntarily left such work without good
cause and the week in which he filed for
benefits he shall be so disqualified for
the week in which he filed for benefits
and for not less than one or more than
the five next following weeks.
Various courts have defined "good cause."

Defendant's own

General Rules of Adjudication 210 provide an excellent summary
of the principles found in so many of these cases:
"Good Cause", as used in the unemployment
insurance system, is such a cause as justifies
an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of
the employed and joining the unemployed; the
leaving must be for such a cause as would reasonably
motivate in a similar situation the average worker
to give up employment with its wage rewards to
become unemployed. The term suggests, as minimum
requirements, real circumstances, substantial
reasons, objective conditions, perceivable forces,
adequate excuses that will bear the test of reason,
just grounds for action. To constitute good cause,
the circumstances which compel the decision to
leave must be real, not imaginary; substantial,
not trifling; and reasonable, not whimsical.
There must be some compulsion from some outside
and necessitous circumstance. The standard
of what constitutes good cause is the standard
of reasonableness as applied to the average
individual and not to the supersensitive .
... Standing alone, the fact that a worker
accepted a particular job does not make the
job suitable. After a reasonable trail [sic]
he may have found it to be, in fact, unsuitable.
Thus the question of "good cause" is to be determined
from the particular circumstances of each case.

Wilton v.

Employment Division, 553 P.2d 1071 (Or.App. 1976).

Another

court went further to say in Sauls v. Employment Security
Agency, 377 P.2d 789, 793

(Ida. 1963), citing National

Furniture Manufacturing Company v. Review Board of Indiana,
170 N.E.2d 381:

-4-
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"We are of the opinion that all the circumstances * * *
in each case of voluntary quitting have to be
considered, and that if there are other factors
involved, such as provocation brought on by unjust
reprimands or unjust discrimination between
employees or any other evidenciary factors which
would have a strong influential effect upon the
mind of the employee contributing to or causing
him to voluntarily quit his employment, such
contributing factors might, under certain circumstances, be considered as good cause within the
purview of the Act, sufficient to enable the
employee voluntarily quitting his job to secure
compensation under the Act*** ".
Against the backdrop of these considerations, the testimony
at the hearing shows that Plaintiff accepted the particular
job willing to occasionally work on Saturday but expressly
and emphatically stipulating not on Sunday.
0035, 0036, and 0039).

(R.0028, 0032,

Plaintiff further stated at R.0010:

However, I made the stipulation when I began
working there that I would not or did not wish
to work on Sundays. This I made quite clear
so that I only came in on Sundays when emergency
situation was arising and I needed the Saturday
that she had asked me to come in to work on to
complete urgent personal business and I asked
that liberty because I realized that in order
to keep my job that it was imperative that I
work for her that weekend. It would have been
much to my advantage to have had the entire
weekend off but did not ask for it off as I
could see that she was making it a crucial
"test" that I work that weekend. This was in
view of the need for me to complete my move
that weekend to another apartment in order not
to have to pay double apartment rent. I did,
however, make the stipulation quite clear when
or before I began working there that I did not
wish to work on Sundays. I believe that Sundays
are a day of rest and whatever way and mode you
may wish to worship is fitting for your conscience.
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The employer, while at first attempting to maintain
that such a stipulation as to Sunday work had not been made,
came around to admitting it at R.0031:

Q. Did she discuss, ever discuss this matter
of Sunday working with you, to the end that it
be discontinued?
Ms. Leininger. Never.
She never. The first,
uh, and really on the first time she said she
would be prefer it's true she preferred to work
Saturday afternoon and I said that would be fine.
I said it would never be any more than one or
two Saturdays a month.
[Emphasis added.]
In fact, Saturday work appears to have been the norm,
with Sundays added.

These were such infringements on religious

freedom as have been harshly conde11U1ed by courts nationwide,
led by the United States Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) where a Seventh-Day Adventist had been
denied unemployment compensation benefits for leaving her
employment, because it required her to work on her Sabbath,
a Saturday rather than Sunday.

At 374 U.S. 403 the Court

stated:
We turn first to the question whether the
disqualification for benefits imposes any
burden on the free exercise of appellant's
religion. We think it is clear that it does.
In a sense the consequences of such disqualification to religious principles and practices
may be only an indirect result of welfare
legislation within the State's general competence to enact; it is true that no criminal
sanctions directly compel appellant to work a
six-day week. But this is only the beginning,
not the end, of our inquiry.
fFn. omitted.]
For "[i]f the purpose or effect of a law is
to impede the observance of one or all religions
or is to discriminate invidiously between
religions, that law is constitutionally invalid
even though the burden may be characterized as
being only indirect." Braunfeld v. Brown, supra
(366 US at 607). Here not only is it apparent
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that appellant's declared ineligibility
for benefits derives solely from the practice
of her religion, but the pressure upon
her to forgo that practice is unmistakable.
The ruling forces her to choose between
following the precepts of her religion
and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand,
and abandoning one of the precepts of
her religion in order to accept work,
on the other hand. Governmental imposition
of such a choice puts the same kind of
burden upon the free exercise of religion
as would a fine imposed against appellant
for her Saturday worship.
To this is added the language of the above-cited
General Rules of Adjudication 210:

"ILmight also be said that

good cause exists when the work is such that the claimant
might have rightfully refused it as unsuitable if it were
offered to him while he was unemployed."
More recently, the Sherbert case was relied on
in Lincoln v. True, 408 F. Supp. 522 (W.D.Ky. 1975).
court also based its decision on 42

u.s.c.

That

§1983, which states:

Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
In Utah the individual right and freedom to hold
religious beliefs is protected with similar strength.
The Utah Constitution, Art. I, §1 declares:
All men have the inherent and inalienable
right to enjoy and defend their lives and
liberties; to acquire, possess and protect
property; to worship according to the dictates
of their consciences; to assemble peaceably,
protest against wrongs, and petition for
redress of grievances; to communicate freely
their thoughts and opinions, being responsible
for the abuse of that right.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Utah Constitution provides further in
Art. I, §4:
The rights of conscience shall never be
infringed. The State shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
no religious test shall be required as a
qualification for any off ice of public
trust or for any vote at any election; nor
shall any person be incompetent as a
witness or juror on account of religious
belief or the absence thereof.
And in Art. III:
The following ordinance shall be irrevocable
without the consent of the United States and
the people of this State:
First: ~ Perfect toleration of religious
sentiment is guaranteed. No inhabitant of
this State shall ever be molested in person
or property on account of his or her mode of
religious worship; but polygamous or plural
marriages are forever prohibited.
The fundamental right of religious freedom guaranteed
in so many places in the Utah Constitution is surely not to be
casually disregarded.

Requiring Plaintiff to work on

Sundays against her express religious belief and making
her compliance with such demands a test of continued employment (R. 0010) can hardly be called "perfect toleration of
religious sentiment."

The right to not have religious

beliefs infringed upon in employment is further guaranteed
in the General Rules of Adjudication 90:

"An individual

who in good faith refuses or leaves employment on ethical
or religious grounds is considered to have had good cause
in so doing."
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The sincerity of Plaintiff's beliefs such that they
should be protected from infringement is shown not just by
the testimony of all parties at the hearing, but also by
the fact that Plaintiff felt compelled to initiate a grievance
proceeding protesting infringement (R.0032, 0036, 0039)
That these procedures were not prosecuted to fruition
was clearly a result of Plaintiff believing that further
effort would be futile and possibly harmful to her continued
employment, as shown at R.0036:

"Ms. Robinson.

I was

told by Mr. Hubbard that there probably wasn't a law that
would support my request."

R.0039-40 further shows

Plaintiff's principles concerning Sunday work and discouragement from the grievance procedure:

Q. How many Sundays all told, during the five
months you were there, did you have to work?
Ms. Robinson.

I should not have had to work any.

Q. Uh, that wasn't my question. Let's let
my rephrase that. How many Sundays did you
work? As a total?
Ms. Robinson.

I would say probably two.

Q. Two. And, uh, since you objected to that
evidently you talked to the, uh,
Ms. Robinson.

Mr. Hubbard.

Q. Mr. Hubbard, the Employer Relations Representative. Why didn't you continue your grievance
through him on that matter, reduce it to writing
as he requested. He asked you if you would reauce
it to writing, you did object to that and that was
the right you had you could have exercised do
correct this situation.

-9-
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Ms. Robinson.
It, uh, I talked with Mr. Hubbard
and he, uh, seemed to indicate that even if I
had requested this and asked that, uh, there be
a decision made on this, the decision could
still be such that I would be required to work
on Sundays. So that it would not have been
advantageous to me from my own personal, uh,
chasing, or belief, or chasing not to work on
Sundays.

Q. But, you could have still reduced this to
writing as he requested. He testified that
he asked you to make your appeal, or your
grievance in writing. This would allow some
basis to take action. This is a course open
to you.
Ms. Robinson. Well, if I understood it would
have done any good so I didn't feel
Although most cases hold that an employee is not
required to attempt to work out his grievances, Plaintiff
even comes within those cases that do so hold.

Glennen

v. Employment Division, 549 P.2d 1288, 1289 (Or.App. 1976),
states this requirement:
[T]hat in order to have good cause for leaving
work, an employe with grievances about employment must indicate an effort to work out the
problem unless the employe can demonstrate
that such effort would be futile.
[Citations
omitted.]
The Department of Employment Security reported its initial
interview of Plaintiff as follows, at R.0047:
Decision: Vol. left work w/good cause.
Clmt tried to have situation corrected
rather than leave but was required to
work Sundays against the conditions
of her hire & rel. conviction.
RS

-10-
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II.

PLAINTIFF DID NOT LEAVE vlORK VOLUNTARILY
WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE, BUT LEFT DUE TO
INFRINGEMENT OF HER FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO
VOTE.

Defendant has endorsed further harassment of
Plaintiff by her employer.

28

u.s.c.

§1343 provides a

cause of action against the State for infringements of
the right to vote.
I, §17 provides:

Further, the Utah Constitution, Art.
"All elections shall be free, and no

power, civil or military, shall at any

~ime

interfere

to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage."
Plaintiff left work due to an employer who deliberately
attempted to prevent her from exercising this right, knowing
her desire to vote but giving made-work to keep her late
in the office until ten minutes before the polls closed.
Plaintiff had to go from the job at the University of Utah
to Sugarhouse to Voting District #2482 within that ten
minutes, jeopardizing her safety.

(R.0012, 0034)

She

was the very last to vote according to the pollbook.

That

Plaintiff by seconds was able to exercise her voting right
does not obscure the employer's persistent obstruction.
The United States Supreme Court has ruled on the protected
status of the right to vote time and time again.

As stated

in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963):
This court has consistently recognized that
all qualified voters have a constitutionally
protected right "to cast their ballots and
have them counted at congressional elections."
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United States v. Classic, 313 US 299, 315, 85
Led 1368, 1377, 61 S Ct 1031; see Ex Parte
Yarbrough, 110 US 651, 28 Led 274, 4 S Ct
152; Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 US 58, 45 Led
84, 21 S Ct 17; Swafford v. Templeton, 185
US 487, 46 Led 1005, 22 S Ct 783.
Again in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968), citing
a previous United States Supreme Court case:
No right is more precious in a free country
than that of having a voice in the election
of those who make the laws under which, as
good citizens, we must live. Other rights,
even the most basic, are illusory if the
right to vote is undermined.
[Fn. omitted.]
Even if a constitutional right is not denied absolutely, a
chilling effect on the exercise of that right is likewise
unconstitutional, as held in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 631 (1969):
If a law has "no other purpose ... than to
chill the assertion of constitutional rights
by penalizing those who choose to exercise
them, then it [is] patently unconstitutional".
United States v. Jackson, 390 US 570, 581 ... (1968).
III.

PLAINTIFF DID NOT LEAVE WORK VOLUNTARILY
WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE, BUT LEFT DUE TO
HARASSMENT AND UNREASONABLE WORKING
CONDITIONS.

The employer here, also engaged in a constant
campaign of criticism, ridicule, and harassment, demonstrated by the nature and number of harsh letters sent from
Plaintiff's supervisor, dated Nov. 30 (R.25), Jan. 18
(R.0023), Jan. 31 (R.0024) and Feb. 3 (R.0022).

As i f

this barrage was not enough, the employer insisted on demeaning
Plaintiff by making unfounded accusations against her in

-12-
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front of fellow workers (R.0011, 0012, 0040).

The

harassment was apparently without just cause as the
Plaintiff was never charged with inadequate job performance.

Nowhere in relation to Plaintiff's Unemployment

Compensation claim are there any allegations of misconduct such as would disqualify her from benefits.

Plaintiff

stated at R.0039:
Ms. Robinson. As far as my job performance,
I have, uh, we kept copies of all the work
that we did, original work, and I had a book
of at least I would say, three or four inch,
as large as those books that you have on
your desk there, book and had started on
another one. As far as production, my
shorthand was corning along very well, in
fact, on one day I took, uh, 28 or 30 pages
of legal a typewriter pad, this full, over
the telephone, in notes from her and typed, uh,
subsequently the notes and I have a copy
of that draft of notes showing that the steno
and typing was satisfactory.
Harassment is not too harsh a word for undue criticism
of perfectly satisfactory work, as is here demonstrated by
the letters and exacerbated by embarrassment in front of
co-workers.

This harassment compelled Plaintiff to leave

her job and constituted good cause for leaving, as repeatedly
held by the Oregon court:
There is substantial evidence to support the
referee's findings that claimant's supervisor
was arbitrarily harassing claimant, that this
harassment made claimant's working conditions
such that a reasonable prudent workman would
find them to be intolerable, and that therefore
Claimant had "good cause" to quit her job.
Stevenson v. Morgan, 522 P.2d 1204, 1207
(Or.App. 1974).

-13-
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And in Chamberlee v. Employment Division,541 P.2d 165, 166
(Or.App. 1975):
Good cause has been defined as "such
cause as would compel a reasonably prudent
person to quit under similar circumstances."
Brotherton v. Morgan, 17 Or.App. 435,
438, 522 P2d 1210, 1212 (1974) . One
of the circumstances which may provide
good cause to leave employment, is harassment by one's employer.
The employer here further refused to cooperate with
Plaintiff when she was trying to move (R.0035) or when she
wanted to visit her sick mother (R.0011).

Plaintiff was

required to work all different hours of the day on an undependable basis (R.0041).

The employer kept Plaintiff

overtime, knowing that Plaintiff was physically debilitated
through illness (R.0040-41):

Q.

How long had you been working that day?

Ms. Robinson.
I had been working the same number
of hours I had been working any other day.
Q.

From 7:00 in the morning?

Ms. Robinson. Right, but I had been ill the
day before. I indicated to her that I was very
tired, that I hadn't been feeling well the day
before. She required me to work until I think
it was 9:30, maybe it was later than that, 9:30
10:00 at night and by that time I was so very
tired I could almost phys was unable physically
completely to drive home.

Q.

Uh-huh.

Ms. Robinson. I have checked several people who
could attest to this if they would, whatever
wish to do so. Uh, I told her that when I
went home she required me to work to 10:00 or
9:30 10;00 that night and when she did this
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I decided, uh, I was not going to quit my
government job and felt this was absolutely
unnecessary for her to require a person to
work beyond what they considered, I had been
working perhaps when I was tired before, but
I was so very tired, completely exhausted at
that point I felt it was very unreasonable
and inhumane for her to require me to continue
working.
The employer also refused to allow Plaintiff to schedule
her compensatory time, which was accumulated overtime,
(R.0036), as had been agreed under the terms of Plaintiff's
hiring.
No reasonable worker would put up with these
harassments, noncooperation in every aspect of employment,
criticism, and infringement of constitutional freedoms.

A

worker would be entirely justified in refusing a job with
such harassments and restrictions, as stated in the General
Rules of Adjudication 210, "It might also be said that good
cause exists when the work is such that the Claimant might
have rightfully refused it as unsuitable if it were offered
to him while he was unemployed."

In this case, it would be

more reasonable for a person to leave such work than to
remain.

Only a very abnormal and unusual person would

remain under such circumstances.
CONCLUSION
Since there is no substantial evidence to support
disqualification of Plaintiff on the grounds of voluntarily
leaving without good cause, but overwhelming evidence of
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such intolerable working conditions that any reasonable
person would leave, Defendant's decision of disqualification
should be reversed.

If Defendant's decision were left to

stand, it would serve to endorse the infringement of constitutional rights as a reasonable condition of work.

Judgment

should be entered that as a matter of law Plaintiff is
entitled to Unemployment Compensation benefits from February
20, 1977, until April 2, 1977.
Respectfully submitted,

Lucy Billings
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIF:CATE OF DELIVERY
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that I hand-delivered a copy
of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant to K. Allan
Zabel, Special Assistant Attorney General, Department of
Employment Security, 174 Social Hall Avenue, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84147, on this 25th day of October, 1977.

~/'fl.({~
Diana M. Hardman
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